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1 Introduction
In recent years economists have played an important role in developing matching models to
reduce waiting times for kidney donation, with the work of Alvin Roth perhaps most prominent
(Ashlagi and Roth, 2014; Fumo et al., 2015; Anderson et al., 2015; Roth, 2015). This has
undoubtedly helped improve the situation for those waiting for donors (Krudy, 2012). However,
we are still very far from solving the problem of long waiting lists and tragically many patients
die each year before a suitable donor is found. In the USA, there were 90,421 people on the
waiting list for a kidney as of July 2021 (OPTN, 2021) with around 50.2% waiting more than
2 years in the list, while according to the National Kidney Foundation the mean waiting time is
3.6 years. In 2014, 4,761 patients (13 a day) died waiting for a transplant while another 3,668
became too sick to receive a transplant before they were offered one. In the UK the situation is
similar with the National Health Service reporting a waiting list of 6,000 people in 2021, and
350 deaths while waiting for a transplant in 2020. The cost in human lives and in suffering
is hard to overstate and there is no question that this remains an important and topical issue
in many nations. In contrast Iran, the world’s only country to have a legal and government-
regulated kidney market, has almost no waiting list and virtually no deaths caused by a lack of
an available kidney (Yanklowitz, October 27, 2015). In Iran around 40% of kidney transplants
are performed from live donors with the remainder taken posthumously (IRNA, 2018; Kidney
Foundation of Iran, 2018).1
There is no doubt that the notion of paying for a kidney raises ethical concerns and some see
this form of market transaction as incompatible with the “sacred value” of human life (Elias et
al., 2015). However, given the apparent success of the Iranian kidney market and the existence
of long waiting lists, patient suffering and significant loss of life elsewhere, there has also been
something of a re-evaluation of the potential for regulated organ markets in the developed world,
with a recent paper suggesting that 71% of the public would support a shift towards introducing
payment for organ donations (Elias et al., 2015). Within medicine there have been debates
going back some years on whether payment should be actively considered (Erin and Harris,
2003). There has also been media coverage in which prominent economists have put forward
the case for a kidney market (Becker and Elias, 2014; Zurga, 2016). In the wider context there
has also been related research on the role of monetary incentives in other health-related areas
such as blood donations (Lacetera et al., 2013) and vaccinations (Weaver et al., 2014; Yamin
and Gavious, 2013).
Given the nature of the debate it seems important to consider the characteristics of those likely
to come forward as donors if a market is established and to ask what special features they
1Note that following convention even if payment is involved, anyone who willingly relinquishes a kidney for
transplantation is referred to as a “donor” throughout the medical and social science literature as well as in practice
and we will continue that convention in this paper.
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may possess. Since there is only one existent regulated market, this must involve a controlled
examination of participants in the Iranian kidney market. Our paper reports the outcome of an
unprecedented first study of patient behavior in the Iranian kidney market in which we obtained
direct access to donors before and after surgery. We provided full incentives where appropriate
during our experimental treatments, providing incentive payments of around $50 (in terms of
purchasing power parity) on top of a show-up fee of roughly $15.2 We also collected data that
is similar to existing generic data on the Iranian population. This allows us to not only provide
comparisons within our sample but also between our sample and Iranian averages where data is
available.
To provide some background, the adoption of a regulated market mechanism for kidney pro-
curement in Iran started in 1988 in the absence of sufficient posthumous donations (Ghods and
Savaj, 2006). The mechanism allows living unrelated Iranian individuals to donate kidneys to
Iranian patients with end stage renal disease (ESRD) for financial gains. The program was suc-
cessful in eliminating the renal transplant waiting list within a decade of its implementation. In
addition, the Organ Transplant Act legalized brain-stem death donations in 2000. The share of
living unrelated donations (LURD) declined from 86% in 2000 to 69% (or 1577 kidney trans-
plants) in 2010 (Mahdavi-Mazdeh, 2012). The Association for Supporting Renal Patients, a
non-profit organization (NGO), facilitates the market exchange. Both ESRD patients and po-
tential kidney donors are referred and registered with the NGO. A primary medical evaluation is
subsequently conducted by the NGO. Upon successful completion of the test, a formal consent
is acquired and the potential donor and the recipient are introduced to each other. At this stage
both the patient and the donor are referred to a nephrologist for further evaluation, cross-match,
and angiography. If the patient-donor pair is compatible, in the next step the pair negotiate
the terms and conditions of the exchange. All terms within the price-cap, set by the NGO, are
guaranteed and enforceable by the NGO. The price-cap is frequently adjusted for inflation and
during the course of our study was set at 180 million Iranian Rial (US$4,700 in August 2017).
However, the negotiation is private and the pair can agree any terms they wish. The donor also
receives a “gift of altruism” and 1 year of insurance from the government through the Char-
ity Foundation for Special Diseases. Transplant surgery is carried out free of charge in public
university hospitals. The Iranian Ministry of Health and Medical Education introduced further
procedural changes in July 2019. In particular, they established a center for organ transplant
and procurement at the ministry which acts as the matching centre and provides oversight and
overall control of the process.
The Association for Supporting Renal Patients provided us with contact details of potential
donors and permission to approach them, and also provided a venue for our experimental ses-
sions at their main building. While our methods are described in full in the Materials and Meth-
2Full details are provided in Section 2 below.
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ods section, we can summarize the core features here. Subjects were invited to attend a session
on a day of their choosing and data was collected on an Android tablet using a purpose-built app
designed to implement our experiment. Each of our 215 participants attended an uninterrupted
session which took approximately 2 hours. The study started in August 2017 (shortly after
the end of sanctions between the UK and Iran) and live sessions continued until May 2019,
with further telephone interviews and follow-up sessions continuing until February 2021. 78
subjects were first interviewed post-donation while the remaining 137 were interviewed pre-
donation. Of the pre-donation group 91 were contacted a second time to confirm their final
status in February 2021. 35 had donated by this point with the remaining 56 dropping out of
the market (30 for medical reasons and 26 through choice). Following this process we were
able to measure behavioral variables such as risk aversion, time preference (patience), altruism,
rationality (consistency with GARP, the generalized axiom of revealed preference), and a wide
variety of demographic and socioeconomic data. Where feasible we incentivized answers and
used the most prominent measures available. We also examined why these patients enter the
market and what alternatives might have been available to them. We are able to compare our
patient data with available data for typical Iranians to provide a benchmark (Falk et al., 2018)
and we would like to thank Falk et al for providing us with early access to the raw data for Iran
used in their work which made these comparisons possible.
We present the result of a series of mean comparisons between the Iranian population and
participants in the kidney market, and between participants at different stages of the process. We
also undertake an analysis of market participation and a longitudinal (and pseudo-longitudinal)
study to tease out the role of different behavioral characteristics in the decision to participate in
the market and to proceed with transplant surgery. Our results, presented in full below, paint a
surprisingly consistent picture. While the typical donor is in considerable financial difficulty,
they are significantly more patient and exhibit lower tolerance for risk than an average Iranian
(though conditional on entering the market those with lower patience are more likely to have
donated during our study). Those who go through with the process exhibit higher levels of
altruism than those who drop out. We find no difference in rationality between participants
in the market and the subjects in a leading study of rationality from which we take our core
measure (Choi et al., 2014). We would argue that alternative options for those in financial
difficulty such as approaching a loan shark might be more appealing to the risk-loving (and
perhaps more impatient) since this offers an immediate solution but replaces it with a serious
and risky long-term liability, while the organ market is a difficult short-term prospect but does
not result in higher levels of debt in the long run. Our findings on altruism are consistent with the
idea that, while donors are being paid, they are nevertheless taking part in a difficult process that
has the potential of saving a life, and this may also be important when considering alternatives.
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2 Methods
Our main method was the use of an experimental design combined with a series of survey
questions all undertaken in the field. Our design was registered in August 2017 at the start
point of the field study (Moghaddasi-Kelishomi and Sgroi, 2017) which ran until May 2019,
with further telephone interviews and follow-up sessions continuing until February 2021. Early
access to patients in the Iranian kidney market provided by the non-profit organization (NGO)
“Association for Supporting Renal Patients” was a crucial part of our design: in many cases we
were able to interview patients long before they were due to go through the donation procedure
and follow this up at a later date whether surgery had taken place or not, allowing us to draw
a distinction between those who opted to continue with surgery, those who did not by choice,
and those who dropped out for medical reasons. We also conducted interviews with patients
who had already donated and were fortunate to have raw data for typical Iranians provided
by Falk et al. (2018). This provides us with a number of dichotomies across a wide range
of experimentally generated data (such as attitudes towards risk, patience levels, rationality as
measured by consistency with the generalized axiom of revealed preference, etc.) as well as
more traditional survey questions and demographic data. In the remainder of this section we
will first go through the design in more detail before moving on to a summary of more practical
aspects of the study. The full experimental script is provided in the Appendix.
Experimental Design. All of our 215 participants took part in an experimental procedure
located in the Iranian capital Tehran, including a set of 11 tasks which are detailed in full in the
Appendix and will be described below.3
The first task is a questionnaire containing a series of basic demographic questions (gender,
age, siblings, religious beliefs, marital status, children, gender, self-reported happiness and ed-
ucation level) and questions relating to their history of donations (including blood donation
and intention to provide posthumous organ donations). The second task switches attention to
economic data including employment status, income, job details, property ownership, car own-
ership, family economic status, and information relating to the organ sale including price paid,
advice received from others concerning the process, and questions relating to their willingness
to go ahead for a lower price, and their willingness to sign an organ donation form (for posthu-
mous donation) at the end of the session. This final question is followed up with the provision
and signing of the official form for those who indicate that they are willing and therefore pro-
vides a relatively robust test of true intentions. This is something that we will focus on in some
detail in the results section. Task 3 is a further questionnaire this time focusing on expectations
3To give an idea of scale, in 2017 there were 931 kidney transplants from live donors in the whole of Iran (Kidney
Foundation of Iran, 2018). There are 30 kidney transplants units in Iran with 12 units located in Tehran and the rest
in other Iranian cities (IRNA, 2018). Our sample is therefore a non-trivial proportion of all live donors in Tehran
and indeed even within Iran.
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about well-being, health and employment prospects after the operation and possible alternatives
to the operation (such as bank loans, borrowing from family and selling assets if available).
The next part of the experimental design shifts away from demographics and survey questions
towards a series of incentivized tasks designed to reveal behavioral characteristics. Task 4 is a
simple check on basic understanding and numeracy before the main tasks and includes simple
questions such as: “what is 50% of 200,000 rials?” Task 5 is timed intelligence test which
presents a simple example followed by a set of 15 Raven’s graphical matrix questions which
is a commonly used “IQ” test (the full set is presented in the Supplementary Materials). Par-
ticipants were give 8 minutes in total (a countdown timer was clearly visible). Task 6 is our
measure of rationality following directly from Choi et al. (2014) and measures consistency of
individual choices with the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). The partici-
pants are presented with a sequence of decision problems under risk, with each presented as a
choice from a two-dimensional budget line. Exactly as in Choi et al. (2014) each choice of the
allocation from the budget line represented an allocation of points between accounts A and B
(corresponding to the horizontal and vertical axes) and the incentivized payoffs of a particular
choice were determined by the allocation to the A and B accounts; the subject received the
points allocated to one of the accounts A or B, determined at random.
Task 7 provides our core incentivized measure of attitudes towards risk and is taken from the
risk “staircase” developed in Falk et al. (2018). Participants are asked an initial question in
which they have to state their preference between a sure payment and a gamble. Depending
upon their answer they move forward to a new question and this is repeated until a total of five
questions have been answered. Task 8 switches back to a set of miscellaneous non-incentivized
questions, mainly about the participant’s experiences in the organ market including whether
they would recommend the market to friends and family, whether they feel the current system
performs well, the money they have received and what they used the money for as well as some
hypothetical questions about time preference and about depression. Task 9 mirrors task 7 but
this time following the “staircase” approach to measuring time preference and this provides our
core incentivized measure of patience. Task 10 presents the 10-question version of the Big Five
Personality Inventory (Rammstedt and John, 2007). Task 11 concludes the experiment with the
15-question version of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Spinella, 2007).
For those subjects who took part in two sessions, the only changes made were to adjust the
questions to refer to post-donation rather than pre-donation where relevant. The show-up fee
and Incentive payments remained the same.
Logistics. The average number of participants per session was 5.6 and refreshments were pro-
vided during the session. We examined a total of 215 participants throughout the study. 78 were
first interviewed post-donation while the remaining 137 were interviewed pre-donation. Of the
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pre-donation group 91 were contacted a second time to confirm their final status in February
2021. 35 had donated by this point with the remaining 56 dropping out of the market (30 for
medical reasons and 26 through choice).
Pre-donation participants were interviewed for the first time prior to transplant surgery. We
collected a list of those who registered with the NGO to donate their kidney once every week or
every two weeks over the months over which we conducted the interviews.4 Upon receiving the
list, we contacted everyone on the list to invite them for an interview. Not all participants were
able to attend the interviews because of the long travel time from other cities to Tehran where
the interviews were held, difficulties taking time off work for the interviews and so on, though
we adjusted our show-up fee to control for travel costs in order to mitigate this to the best of our
ability.
In follow-up phone interviews, we distinguished between participants who declared “they are
still waiting for the donation” and those who declared that they had changed their mind. We
do not include the earlier group in any of the comparisons presented in the paper since their
status is essentially unchanged from first contact. The average waiting time between the first
interview and the transplant surgery in our sample is about 54 days. The latest follow-up update
in February 2021 is 639 days after the first interview of the last person in our sample. Of
the 137 individual potential donors, the final status of 46 participants is unknown after the
second interview: these are individuals who could not be reached by telephone. Table 1 shows
little meaningful difference between respondents and non-respondents in the second interview
suggesting that there is little evidence of bias in attrition.
Summary statistics are provided in Table 2. Demographic and socioeconomic information is
summarized in Table 3 and we can see that the pre-donation and post-donation pools are in gen-
eral similar, though our results section examines the differences at length. Finally, we provide
descriptive statistics for the key behavioral characteristics in Table 4. A summary of the values
from our full set of participants is provided in the top section drawn from their first experimental
session, while the lower section provides averages from the Iranian population (who were not
incentivized and who took part in a telephone interview session) drawn from Falk et al. (2018).
Payments were split between a show-up fee and incentive payments. The show-up fee was set
at 200,000 Rials which is the equivalent to $5.23 (converted via the market exchange rate) or
$15.32 (in terms of purchasing power parity).5 Incentive payments varied but typically were
4There were exogenous logistic interruptions (such as a change in the administration of the NGO or health team)
that forced us to suspend our study twice for two months over the period of the study. These exogenous events
were outside of our control and were not correlated with any of the behavioral characteristics within our pool.
5Conversions were calculated using the market exchange rate of 38,210 IRR = 1 USD from www.tgju.org for
the market rate. For purchasing power parity, the conversion was calculated using the purchasing power parity
conversion factor, GDP (LCU per international $) for 2017, 13,061.3 = 1 USD from the World Banks’ world
development indicator.
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made in the range of 600,000–700,000 Rials or equivalently $15.69–$18.31 (market exchange
rate) or $45.96–$53.62 (purchasing power parity). We adjusted the show up fee and incentive
payments annually to account for inflation during the study using the official inflation rate from
the Statistical Centre of Iran.
3 Results
In this section we first discuss broad features of the data focusing on three behavioral param-
eters: rationality, time-preference and attitudes towards risk. We then move on to a Probit
analysis of participation in the market in which we highlight the importance of risk, patience,
performance in the Raven’s matrix (IQ) test and other variables which includes a pseudo longi-
tudinal panel.
In what follows we mainly make use of data from our own pool of organ market patients but
occasionally we compare this data with data from Falk et al. (2018) for average Iranians which
was collected as part of the Gallup world poll in 2012. Their data set is a representative sample
of Iranian adults and since we opted to measure attitudes towards risk and time preferences in
exactly the same way as in Falk et al. (2018), this provides a useful benchmark for our own
data. However it should be noted that Gallup employed telephone interviews (both landline
and cellular) to collect their data which was not incentivized. Together with risk and time-
preference we also have access to gender and age. Given the small size of our pool of organ
market participants as compared with the general population, we assume that the Falk et al.
(2018) sample does not include any kidney market participants. Comparisons between our
sample and the general Iranian population allow us to get a feel for how similar or different
a typical Iranian donor might be to typical citizen which might be of particular interest when
considering take-up for any country moving towards a regulated kidney market.
Mean Comparisons. Our core measure of rationality follows directly from Choi et al. (2014)
who develop a method for testing consistency of individual choices with the Generalized Axiom
of Revealed Preference (GARP). The process is incentivized and described in the Materials and
Methods section (and shown in full in the Supplementary Material). Following this procedure,
each subject’s performance is summarised in a CCEI score. This score provides a direct measure
of the extent to which a budget line needs to be raised to remove violations of GARP: to that
extent the 1 − CCEI gives the percentage increase that is required. The CCEI scores for our
subjects averaged 0.85 over all participants in session 1. This translates to a need to reduce
the budget line by 15 percent, on average, to eliminate a subject’s GARP violations. This is
similar to the average of 0.881 in Choi et al. (2014). Panel (a) in figure 1 illustrates the mean
rationality scores and 95 percent confidence intervals over different socioeconomic groups. The
graph suggests that high-education subjects, subjects with a university degree, are more likely
to have choices that are consistent with GARP than medium-education, high school education,
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donors (p=0.007) and low-education, primary and secondary education, donors (p = 0.001).
From panel (a) of figure 1 we can also see that females display higher levels of consistency than
males but not significantly so (p = 0.356). Young subjects, aged below the sample-average
age of 32 years, display higher levels of consistency than those who are above the average age
(p = 0.281), which is consistent with the findings in Choi et al. (2014).
Moving on to time-preference, panel (b) of figure 1 groups mean patience levels with associated
95 percent confidence intervals by socioeconomic groups. We elicit time-preference using the
staircase procedure outlined in Falk et al. (2018) and in the Materials and Methods section (and
the full procedure is given in the Supplementary Material) which also gives us access to data for
the Iranian population, displayed in panel (c). Subjects face five interdependent hypothetical
binary choices between immediate and delayed financial rewards and in each of five questions
subjects chose between a payment today and a larger payment in 2 weeks. The immediate
payment is fixed over the subsequent 4 questions. However, in order to narrow down the reward
at which subjects are indifferent between the immediate payment and the delayed payment,
the delayed payment increases or decreases following the answer to the previous question. A
question is then selected randomly and the participant’s choice results in an incentive payment
made at the end of the session (or two weeks later as appropriate).
The patience levels shown in panels (b) and (c) of figure 1 range from 1, the least patient, to
32, the most patient. The average patience level for participants in session 1 is around 13.07 for
kidney donors which is statistically very much higher than the average patience level of 3.75
in the Iranian population (p = 0.000). Females on average display higher patience levels than
males, although not statistically significant within our kidney market sample (p = 0.342) as
compared to the Iranian population sample in which there is mild significance (p = 0.049). We
also see some evidence of variation by age and education: for instance higher levels of patience
in medium-education subjects and those with higher age than average though these findings are
not statistically significant (for age for instance p = 0.147).
Moving on to attitudes towards risk, panels (d) and (e) of figure 1 show the mean risk-taking
levels and 95 percent confidence intervals by socioeconomic groups for kidney donors and the
Iranian population respectively. Following Falk et al. (2018) we again use a staircase procedure
to elicit subjects’ risk preferences similar to the procedure for time-preference (and which again
gives us access to Iranian population averages), which is described in detail in the Materials and
Methods section (and the full procedure is given in the Supplementary Material). Each subject
is faced with 5 binary questions. In each question subjects choose between a lottery of winning
a fixed amount and zero with equal probability and a varying sure payment.
The risk preference measure ranges from 1, the lowest risk-taking level, to 32, the highest
risk-taking level. The average risk-taking score for participants in session 1 is around 13.93
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for kidney donors which is lower than the average risk taking level of 15.77 in the Iranian
population (p = 0.008). In both samples females display more appetite for risk than males
(p = 0.2041 in the organ market, and p = 0.003 in the general Iranian population). Medium-
education subjects display higher levels of risk-taking than subjects with low levels of education
(p = 0.040) or high levels of education (p = 0.1402).
Regression Analysis. Table 5 presents probit estimates for organ market participation. In order
to generate the results in this table, we have pooled the GPS data (N1=2507) with Organ data
(N2=215), giving us a total number of 2722 observations in column 1. Information on risk and
patience is missing for some of the observations in column 2 (reducing the total to 2644). Our
results suggest that males are more likely to donate their kidney and participation is decreasing
by age. A unit increase in our measure of patience increases the likelihood of kidney donation
by 0.83%, (p = 0.000) for males when all other covariates are kept at their mean level. A
unit increase in our measure of risk-taking reduces the likelihood of donating kidney by 0.21%,
(p = 0.001) for males when all other covariates are kept at their mean level.
Table 6 provides a comparison of behavioral characteristics before and after transplantation for a
small sample of 14 patients whom we were able to interview before and after surgery and so the
treatment in this table refers to participants undergoing surgery. The table compares behavior
before and after undergoing kidney transplant surgery. The top panel compares longitudinal
changes in IQ, rationality, attitudes towards risk and patience. The first column presents the
mean change (where the post-surgery value is deducted from the pre-surgery value) in each
measures. A paired t-test was used to evaluate the effect of the treatment within the longitudinal
group. Results suggest that the behavioral characteristics are stable.
Given the small sample we follow the pure longitudinal results with a pseudo-longitudinal anal-
ysis of 113 patients in the lower panel of Table 6. Participants who had not donated their kidney
at the time of their first session but eventually proceed with the transplantation constitute our
pre-surgery group, while those who had donated their kidney before attending the first ses-
sion constitute our post-surgery group. Patience is the only behavioral variable that displays
a significant change (p = 0.001) which suggests that the results in both analyses are broadly
consistent.
We note one potential difference in interpretation when comparing the longitudinal with the
pseudo-longitudinal data. Within the pseudo-longitudinal analysis, the post-surgery group do-
nated up to several years prior to the experimental session and so might be considered a more
long-term comparison than the longitudinal study. Under this interpretation our results indicate
stability in the short-run (longitudinal) and long-run (pseudo-longitudinal).
Table 7 presents probit estimates for the decision to go ahead with transplantation conditional
on participating in the market. The total number of observations is the sum of those who par-
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ticipated in the market and opted to willingly go through with donation and those who changed
their mind and exited the market. The dummy variables blood donation and organ form are the
binary (yes or no) answers to the questions about whether the participant has donated blood be-
fore and whether the participant is willing to sign the organ donation after death form at the end
of the session, respectively. In the latter case subjects completed the form during the session.
A participant who attended the first session but has yet to go through with kidney surgery,
changes status to one of the following: either they proceed with transplantation, or they fail
the medical test and cannot proceed, or they change their mind and exit the market. Table 7
compares the first and the last group: in other words, it represents a choice by the participant
to willingly go through with donation or exit the market. Results from model (3) show that
conditional on participating in the market, those who have lower levels of patience are more
likely to go ahead with donation (recalling from table 5 that participants in the market start with
significantly higher levels of patience that the national average). We also note that those who
are more likely to sign the posthumous organ donation form are also more likely to go ahead
with donation. To give an idea of scale, male participants who are willing to sign the after death
organ donation form are 34% more likely to proceed with donation. A unit increase in our
measure of patience also reduces the chance of proceeding with transplantation by 1.4% when
all other covariates are kept at their mean level.
4 Discussion
Our results can be summarized as the answers to several important questions. The first is
whether Iranian kidney donors are irrational. Our results focus on adherence to the general
axiom of revealed preference (GARP) which is a widely-accepted measure of rationality within
Economics. Our subjects averaged a CCEI score of 0.85 which translates to a need to reduce
the budget line by 15 percent, on average, to eliminate a subject’s GARP violations. This is
similar to the average of 0.881 in the paper that introduced this form of measurement (Choi et
al., 2014). Moreover, our data shows that those with higher levels of education perform better
which is entirely consistent with expectations. We also see no impact on the rationality mea-
sure between key groups within our sample: for instance when evaluating the treatment effect
(of undertaking surgery as opposed to not doing so through choice or otherwise) rationality re-
mains constant. Our results therefore suggest that Iranian kidney donors do not display unusual
levels of irrationality and in fact seem entirely typical. This is also backed up by our finding that
IQ does not play a role in our longitudinal or pseudo-longitudinal analysis, and in some of our
more subjective survey questions which indicate that the decision to donate is made largely for
financial reasons and after significant deliberation: the alternatives (approaching a loan shark or
selling assets such as a car) may well be worse.
This brings us to the second key question: are Iranian kidney donors unusual in terms of their
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risk profile? Our method is to follow the procedure outlined in Falk et al. (2018) and to perform
comparisons with the raw data for Iran provided by the authors of that paper as well as within
sample comparisons. In terms of risk we see highly statistically significantly lower levels of risk
taking preferences in our sample than in the general Iranian population (p = 0.008) comparing
our data to the raw data from Falk et al. (2018). This is confirmed in a regression analysis
indicating that participation in the market falls as risk-taking behavior rises: a unit increase in
our measure reduces participation by 0.21% and is highly significant (p = 0.001). We pick
up no treatment effect in our longitudinal and pseudo longitudinal analysis suggesting that risk
plays a role in entering the market but not through to conclusion. All of this may be a surprise:
we might think that kidney donation involves risk but in line with our findings on rationality, it
may be that donors have considered the alternatives and given their financial position it may be
riskier to opt for a loan shark or to allow debt to accumulate.
The next question concerns patience: are donors simply impatient to raise money which is
pushing them towards a rash decision? Mean comparisons between our sample of participants
in the kidney market and the general Iranian population derived from Falk et al. (2018) show that
our subjects are highly statistically significantly more patient (p = 0.000). This might explain
why they are considering donation given that alternatives such as selling a car or approaching
a loan shark may provide a short term solution to financial difficulties but may also entail more
problems in the long-run. Note that conditional on participating in the organ market, those with
lower levels of patience are more likely to donate.
Finally we have data on a subject’s willingness to sign a posthumous organ donation form (to
relinquish their organs at death). In our longitudinal and pseudo-longitudinal analysis we find
that conditional on participating in the market, those who are more likely to sign the posthu-
mous organ donation form are more likely to go ahead with donation. There is some credibility
attached to this since subjects complete the relevant form as part of the experiment. We might
consider signing an organ form a measure of risk-taking behavior, however, there is absolutely
no correlation between risk-taking behavior and willingness to sign the organ form in our sam-
ple. Therefore we lean towards the interpretation that those who complete surgery are more
altruistic. This is of course consistent in the sense that the final outcome is typically to save
someone’s life (contrasting with an alternative way to raise funds such as approaching a loan
shark) and may also be undertaken in an effort to support a family which already incorporates a
high degree of self-sacrifice.
Table (3) presents the the mean monthly income of our sample as compared to the minimum
income in Iran. The minimum monthly wage in Iran was 11,860,273 Rials over the period of
this study (ILNA, 2021). The average household income in our sample was 15,205,690 Rials.
This is a remarkably small difference suggesting that our samples contains individuals close to
what is considered minimum income in Iran. The average household income over the same time
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period in Iran was 37,298,889 Rials (SCI, 2021). In addition, 18.8% of people aged 18-35 were
unemployed during the period of this study which is much less than our sample of similar age
group (ILNA, 2020). In terms of wealth, only 5.5% of our participants own a house compared
to 64% in the general population, and 72.5% live in a rental property compared to 26% in the
general population in 2018. Only 8.7% of our participants owned a car compare to 53% in the
general population (SCI, 2018). The overall picture is of individuals who are in financial need,
often unemployed but with a family to support and where the alternatives are grim.
However, despite their financial position, these individuals are typically patient and not espe-
cially prone to risk-taking. They are no less rational than the average, but those who end up
completing the process may be characterised by more altruism than those who do not. This
presents what may seem to be a counter-intuitive result: we might have worried that partici-
pants in this market would be relatively irrational and impatient risk-takers, but at least within
the confines of our data and analysis this is not the case.
We should pause to recognize that our data is subject to significant limitations. Any field data
is by nature noisy and while we have tried to provide incentives where possible, and to follow
individuals as best we can, a variety of practical and indeed political issues have made data
collection difficult, ranging from the practical and ethical issues involved in following kidney
transplant patients (we cannot and should not be in a position to guarantee that donors will
attend more than one experimental session or put them under any pressure to do so) through to
periods in which political sanctions made data collection difficult. The administration attached
to the NGO changed several times during our study which slowed data collection. Nevertheless
we are extremely grateful to the NGO for granting us unique and unprecedented access to the
Iranian kidney market which made completion of this study possible and allowed us to provide
the only data on behavioral characteristics of donors in a regulated kidney market.
The Iranian kidney market has undoubtedly saved lives and waiting times for kidneys have col-
lapsed since its inception (Yanklowitz, October 27, 2015). Moreover, opinions in other countries
are shifting in the direction of a regulated market with a recent paper suggesting that 71% of
the US population were in favor of a market once a potential system had been explained (Elias
et al., 2015). In parallel to this there has also been active discussion and research that seeks to
examine the effect of monetary incentives for other health-related activities such as blood dona-
tions (Lacetera et al., 2013) and vaccinations (Weaver et al., 2014; Yamin and Gavious, 2013).
Our results could be interpreted as part of a more positive re-evaluation of applying economic
principles within health markets in recent years. However, we would also suggest caution when
attempting to extrapolate from one culture to another with a very different history or set of val-
ues. We hope that our findings will at least provide some food for thought for those considering
ways to tackle the problem of long waiting times for kidney donation.
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Tables & Figures
Table 1: Behavioral Characteristics by Attrition Status
mean Unknown-Status mean Known-Status Diff. S.D # Obs.
Math 1.478261 1.296703 0.182 0.235 137
IQ 3.586957 3.142857 0.444 0.484 137
Risk taking 14.3 13 1.300 1.680 134
Patience 14.46667 11.0625 3.404 2.076 133
Rationality .8154983 .8675437 -0.052* 0.028 137
Observations 137
Adjusted R2
Note: This table compares mean response/score in different tasks of the pre-donation
participants with the unknown final status (column 1) and known final status (column
2).




Donated Medical Problem Change mind Status Unknown Pre-Total
78 35 30 26 46 137 215
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Table 3: Demographics & Socioeconomic Information
Total Pre-Donation Post-Donation
Female (%) 18.6 19.7 16.7
Age (%)
21-32 54.9 59.1 47.4
32+ 45.1 40.9 52.6
Education (%)
Low 42.4 43 41.3
Medium 43.3 40.7 48
High 14.3 16.30 10.7
Employment (%)
Employed 49.5 47.5 53.25
Income (Iranian Rials)
Monthly indi. income 14,356,570 13,798,410 15,333,300
Monthly house. income 15,205,690 15,170,510 15,266,670
Household Composition (%)
Married 79.1 75.9 85.9
Number of children 2 1.9 2.2
Religious attitudes (%)
Always practice 29.8 23.4 42.6
Sometimes practice 53.7 59.8 41.2
Never practice 16.6 16.8 16.2
Home ownership (%)
Owner 5.5 2.9 10.9
Renting 72.5 72.8 71.9
Living with parents 22 24.3 17.2
Car ownership (%) 8.7 3.7 20
Insurance (%)
Insured 52.9 46.3 65.3
Observations 215 137 78
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
mean # Obs. S.D. min max
Organ Market Participants
Math 1.34 215 1.28 0 4
IQ 3.21 215 2.71 0 13
Risk taking 13.93 210 9.76 1 32
Patience 13.07 205 11.79 1 32
Rationality .847 215 .160 .22223 .99994
Iranian Population
Risk taking 16.12 2463 10.94 1 32
Patience 3.84 2472 6.96 1 32
Note: lower panel observations are from Falk et al. (2018) with values re-weighted
in accordance with the sampling weights to achieve representatives.











Notes: Probit estimates of the participation in the Iranian organ market with standard errors in paren-
theses. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01 with
precise numbers given in the main text.
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Table 6: Evaluating the Treatment Effects
Mean Std. Error 95% Conf. Interval
Longitudinal Comparison
Dif. IQ -0.500 0.552 -1.693 0.693
Dif. Rik taking 2.821 3.204 -4.099 9.742
Dif. Patience -0.393 1.872 -4.438 3.652
Dif. Rationality 0.043 0.047 -0.059 0.145
Pseudo-longitudinal Comparison
Dif. IQ 0.123 0.556 -0.979 1.225
Dif. Risk taking -1.704 2.138 -5.940 2.532
Dif. Patience -7.263*** 2.374 -11.965 -2.560
Dif. Rationality 0.007 0.035 -0.063 0.076
N=14 in the longitudinal analysis and N=113 in the pseudo-longitudinal analysis. Statistical significance is
indicated as follows: ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01 with precise numbers given in the main text.
Table 7: Probit model: Likelihood to Proceed with Transplantation
(1) (2) (3)
male 0.007 0.061 0.369
(0.413) (0.478) (0.501)
















Notes: N=58. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
























































































































































































































































































(e) Mean Risk-Taking Level for Iranian Population
Figure 1: CCEI Scores, Mean Patience Level, and Mean Risk-Taking Level for Kidney Donors




The experimental script is divided into 3 parts.
Part 1 reproduces the information form initially a version translated into English together with
the original version in Persian.
Part 2 reproduces the consent form translated into English.
Part 3 provides the full experimental script including the full content of all 11 tasks translated
into English.
Part 1: Information Form (translated into English)
Information for participants
The project
The project is being run by the Economics department of the University of Warwick. We plan to carry
out a series of experimental sessions with a number of subjects which will involve completing a series
of simple questionnaires and tasks. The results of these sessions will hopefully lead to the production of
one or more academic research papers.
Your participation
If you agree to participate in the project, we will ask you to attend a session in which you may be asked
to complete a number of questionnaires and attempt a number of tasks. You will be paid both a show-up
fee and a supplement based on your performance in the tasks you undertake.
The entire process will be entirely anonymous from the very start - your answers and performance will
be linked to an ID number and not your true name (for example you may be “subject ID06”. There will
be no way of linking your true identity to any of the data we have collected.
The anonymous data generated in the session will be used as the basis for at least one academic paper,
and possibly more. Since the data is anonymous from the moment the study starts it will be impossible
for anyone to link you to the data that is used so your name or identity will never appear in any work
related to this research.
You will be asked to sign a consent form if you agree to take part in the study and a receipt at the point
when you are paid. Both of these documents will be kept in a secure location for 10 years following the
end of the study and then destroyed.
Participation in the project is entirely voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any point without
giving any reason. However, if you do end your participation early you may receive a reduced payment
i
since the payment is in part performance-related.
Potential benefits
You will receive a show-up fee and an additional fee dependent upon your performance in the tasks
during the session. More details about the nature of the payment will be made available during the
session when you are provided with further instructions. To give an example, similar sessions in the past
have typically resulted in payments in the range of 300,000-750,000 Rials for the session and you will
always receive the show-up fee of 200,000 Rials irrespective of your performance during the session.
Complaints
It is up to you whether or not you take part in this interview. Nothing negative will happen if you de-
cide not to take part. Your views are important to us and we hope you will agree to take part. Should
you have any complaints relating this study conducted by a University of Warwick, please contact the
Deputy Registrar: Jo Horsburgh (J.Horsburgh@warwick.ac.uk) Deputy Registrar, Deputy Registrar’s
Office, University of Warwick Coventry, CV4 8UW. PA– Natasha Lynch (Tel: +44 24 765 22706;
n.lynch@warwick.ac.uk)
Please also see: www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/rss/researchgovernance/complaint procedure
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Information Form in Persian
 
 
 کنندگان در طرحاطالعاتی برای مشارکت
 طرح
برگزاری تعدادی جلسه هدف ما  شود.( اجرا میUniversity of Warwickاین طرح تحقیقاتی توسط دانشکده اقتصاد دانشگاه واریک )
منجر به تولید یک یا چند مقاله در نهایت  نتایج این جلسات  .باشد.تستهای ساده با اهدا کنندگان کلیه می ها ونامهششامل پر کردن پرس
 دانشگاهی خواهد شد. -پژوهشی
 مشارکت شما 
تعدادی پرسشنامه را پر کرده و چند ادامه  دربا ی تحقیقاتی، ما از شما خواهیم خواست که در صورت موافقت شما با همکاری در این پروژه
مبلغی به شما پرداخت خواهد شد. همچنین با توجه به عملکرد شما در پاسخ دادن  ابتدا صرفا جهت شرکت در جلسهتست ساده را بگذرانید. 
 به تستها نیز مبالغ دیگری، جدای از مبلغ اولیه، به شما پرداخت خواهد شد. 
دا تا انتها بصورت ناشناس انجام خواهد شد، یعنی در همه مراحل جوابها و عملکرد شما نه با نام شما بلکه با تمامی مراحل انجام پروژه از ابت
آوری خواهیم هایی که ما جمع. در نهایت اسم شما به هیچ عنوان در داده(۶مثال مشارکت کننده شماره خاص مرتبط خواهد شد )ه یک شمار
 کرد بکار برده نخواهد شد. 
ها از ابتدا این دادهکه از آنجا  مورد استفاده قرار خواهد گرفت. مقاله علمییا چند یک و برای نوشتن آوری شده بصورت ناشناس ی جمعهاداده
بنابرین اسم و  ؛ها را مرتبط با نام و هویت شما بکندگردد، به هیچ عنوان کسی نخواهد توانست که این دادهآوری میبصورت ناشناس جمع
 نخواهد آمد.  ،کنندآوری شده ما استفاده میهای جمعدر هیچ یک از تحقیقاتی که از داده هویت شما
، بعد از پرداخت پول، را اگر شما موافق مشارکت در این مطالعه باشید، از شما درخواست خواهد شد که فرم رضایت و همچنین رسید پرداخت
مشارکت در د رفت. ناتمام این پروژه در یک مکان امن نگهداری شده و آنگاه از بین خواهسال بعد از  ۱۰به مدت  هر دو این اسنادامضا کنید. 
دلیل، انصراف دهید. هر چند، از آنجایی که م ای از اجرای آن، بدون اعالباشد و شما مختارید که در هر مرحلهاین پروژه کامال داوطلبانه می
باشد، در صورتی که مشارکت شما نیمه تمام باقی بماند، مبلغ پاسخ دادن به تستها میمقداری از مبلغ پرداختی مرتبط با عملکرد شما در 
  پرداختی به شما کمتر خواهد بود. 
 منافع بالقوه برای شما 
شما بخاطر مشارکت در طرح یک مبلغ اولیه دریافت خواهید کرد. بعالوه یک مبلغ اضافه که بستگی به عملکردتان در انجام تستها در طول 
جلسات مشابه قبلی، مبالغی در بعنوان مثال، در طول جلسه به اطالع شما خواهد رسید.  پرداختهای جزییات بیشتر مرتبط با نحوهجلسه دارد. 
جلسه پرداخت شده است و شما جدای از عملکردتان در جلسه، صرفا برای مشارکت در مطالعه هزار تومان برای یک  ۷۰هزار تومان تا  ۳۵بین 
 هزار تومان دریافت خواهید کرد.  ۲۰مبلغ 
 شکایات
ما برای ما محترم اختیار شماست. عدم تمایل شما به مشارکت هیچ بار منفی برای شما نخواهد داشت. نظر شدر مشارکت در این طرح کامال 
خواهد بود، هر چند امیدواریم که در این طرح مشارکت کنید. لطفا در صورت داشتن هر شکایتی مرتبط با اجرای این مطالعه توسط دانشگاه 
 واریک، با ایمیل زیر تماس بگیرید: 
) .ac.ukJ.Horsburgh@warwickJo Horsburgh ( 
Deputy Registrar, Deputy Registrar's Office, University of Warwick 
Coventry, CV4 8UW 
) n.lynch@warwick.ac.ukNatasha Lynch (Tel: +44 24 765 22706;  –PA  
 :لینک زیر مراجعه کنید به لطفا همچنین
www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/rss/researchgovernance/complaints_procedure/ 
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Part 2: Consent Form
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated [DATE] which I may keep
for my records.
I agree to take part in the above study and am willing to take part in the session dated [DATE]
which may involve undertaking a number of tasks and/or completing a number of question-
naires.
I understand that the data generated during the session will be entirely anonymous so my name
and identity will not be linked to the data that is generated.
I understand that my anonymous data may also be used for future research.
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time.
Name of person taking consent:
Date:




Part 3: Main Tasks
Task 1
This section consists of 12 questions. Please answer all the questions to the best of your ability.
1.1- How would you rate your happiness at the moment? (1-7)
Note: 1 is completely sad, 2 is very sad, 3 is fairly sad, 4 is neither happy nor sad, 5 is fairly happy, 6 is
very happy, 7 is completely happy
1.2- Are you male or female? (m/f) 1-Male 2-Female
1.3- What is your age? (years,months) (yymm)
1.4- How many siblings do you have?
1.5- What is your religion? 1- Islam-Shiite 2-Islam-Sunni 3-Islam 4-Christian 5-None 6-Others
1.6- Do you pray or fast during Ramadan? 1- Always 2- Sometimes 3-Never
1.7- Are you married? (y/n) 1-Yes 2- No 3- Divorced
1.8-Do you have children? (y/n) 1-Yes 2- No
1.9- What is your highest level of education?
(1) Elementary school (2) Secondary school (3) High school (4) Diploma (5) Upper diploma (6) Bachelor
and higher (7) Illiterate
1.10- Have you ever donated blood before? 1-Yes 2- No
1.11- Do you plan to donate organs after the event of your death? 1-Yes 2- No
1.12- Do you know the how much someone who donates his kidney earns?
Task 2
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.
2.1- Have you ever been employed? 1-Yes (Go to 2.2) 2-No (Go to 2.9)
2.2- Are you currently employed? 1- Yes (Go to 2.3) 2-No (Go to 2.5)
If you are employed:
2.3 What is your current monthly salary?
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2.4 What is your job title?
Go to 2.9
If you are unemployed:
2.5 What was your last monthly salary?
2.6 What was your job title?
2.7 When did you leave that employment (unemployment duration in month)?
2.8 For what reason?
2.9 Do you own a house or rent a place: 1- Own 2- Rent 3-Live with parents
2.10-Do you own a car? 1-Yes 2-No
If you are married:
2.11- Is your wife/husband employed? 1-Yes 2- No
2.12- What is their monthly salary?
2.13- Suppose we are willing to give you some money to change your decision. What’s the minimum
amount that makes you happy to do so?
2.14- Do you know anyone around you who has donated his/her kidney before? 1-Yes 2-No
2.15- Did you discuss the decision to donate your kidney with anyone?
1-Yes, and they were okay with it. 2-Yes, and they were not happy with it. 3- No
2.16- How important was the advice of others when making the decision? 1-very important, 2-important,
3-not important.
2.17- How much you were paid for your kidney?
2.18- Were you happy to still donate your kidney if the receiver was not an Iranian? 1-Yes, 2-No
2.19- Were you happy to still donate your kidney for 10 percent less than the amount that you have
received? 1-Yes 2-No
2.20- Are you happy to sign the organ donation for at the end of this session? 1- Yes, 2-No
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Task 3
3.1- Do you expect your happiness level to fall after the operation has been completed? 1-Yes, 2-No
3.2- How would you rate your happiness after the operation is complete? (1-7)
Note: 1 is completely sad, 2 is very sad, 3 is fairly sad, 4 is neither happy nor sad, 5 is fairly happy, 6 is
very happy, 7 is completely happy
3.3- How about 6 months after the operation? (1-7)
Note: 1 is completely sad, 2 is very sad, 3 is fairly sad, 4 is neither happy nor sad, 5 is fairly happy, 6 is
very happy, 7 is completely happy
3.4- What other alternatives you considered to selling your kidney?
1-Bank loan 2- Borrowing from family and friends 3- Sell my assets (house, car, jewellery, etc) 4- No
alternative
3.5- Do you think you will ever fully recover? 1- Yes, 2-No, 3- I don’t know
3.6- What is your blood type?
A+ A- B+ B- O+ O- AB+ AB-
3.7- Do you think your physical condition will deteriorate after the donation? 1- yes, 2-No 3- I don’t
know
3.8 How about 6 months later? 1- Yes, 2- No, 3- I don’t know
3.9- Do you think your life will be negatively affected by the operation? 1- Yes, 2- No, 3- I don’t know
3.10- How do you think your employment prospects will change immediately after the operation? 1-
Improved 2- Worsened 3- No effect
3.11- How about 6 months later? 1- Improved 2- Worsened 3- No effect
3.12- Do you have any health insurance? 1- Social Security 2- Health Insurance 3- Iranian Health Insur-
ance 4- Not insured
3.13- Under which of the following conditions you will be willing to change your donation decision?
1-A bank loan of 100 million Rials, 3 years payment length, and maximum of . . . percent interest rate
2-Leasing a Saipa’s Pride, payment in 5 years, and maximum monthly payment of . . . ..
3.14- Any similar conditions as above? . . . .
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Task 4
Please do your best to answer the following questions – you will be paid 10000 Rials per correct answer.
You may use a pencil and paper to help answer the questions but no calculators. There is also an example
provided:
Example: You know that your chance to win 5000 RLS in a gamble is 10%. If you repeated this many
times what would you make on average in each gamble.
Answer: 500 RLS.
4.1- What’s 50% of 200,000 Rials?
4.2- You know that your chance to win 5000 Rials in a gamble is 30%. If you repeated this many times
what would you make on average in each gamble?
4.3- The original price of a coat is 200000 RLS and you pay 150000 RLS for it. Calculate the percentage
discount?
4.4- Job 1 pays 5 million Rials per month. Job 2 pays 2 million per month plus 15% commission. How
much would you need to sell to get paid the same as job 1?
Task 5
You have 8 minutes to answer all 15 questions.












In this section, 25 charts are shown. In each chart, your task is to distribute points between two accounts
A, the horizontal axis, and B, the vertical axis. Note that every 4 points is equivalent to 10,000 Rials.
In each round, after you allocate your points, the computer will randomly select one account. Each of
the two accounts A and B have the same chance of being selected. Your earnings in this round then is
equal to the points you have allocated to the selected account. You will be paid in cash at the end of the










You may choose any point on the red line, for example, points 1, 2, 3, 4 or any other points you wish. By
choosing a point on the line, the points that are allocated to each account A and B are determined. For
example, if you choose point 2 on the line, you allocate 40 points to account A and 20 points to account
b. The probability that each of the accounts A and B is selected is the same and is 50 percent. Hence, by
choosing point 2, there is a 50 percent chance that you earn 40 points (equivalent to 100,000 Rials) and
50 percent chance that you earn 20 points (50,000 Rials). If you choose point 3, then there is a 50 percent
chance that you earn 80 points (200,000 Rials) and 50 percent chance that you earn 0 points (0 rials).
The points are calculated at the end of the session and you will be paid what you earn. After calculating
the points, a new chart will be shown. Each chart is randomly selected and is independent of your choice
in the previous chart. Your task in each chart is the same as described above. A total of 25 charts like
the example above will be shown. How your reward is calculated: After round 25 and the end of this
activity, a chart is randomly selected by the computer from the 25 charts shown to you. The computer
will randomly selects a number between 1 and 25. This number is the number of the chart from which
your points will be calculated and you will be paid from. In order to practice, you will first be shown 2
practice charts. You can click the start button once you are sure you do not have any problem with this
section to display the main charts.
Task 7
Start with the first question. Depending on whether the participant chooses the lottery or the safe option,
go to the respective next question. This procedure is repeated four times.
Please imagine the following situation: You can choose between a sure payment and a lottery. The lottery
gives you a 50 percent chance of receiving 300 thousands Rial. With an equally high chance you receive
nothing. Now imagine you had to choose between the lottery and a sure payment. We will present to you
have different situations. The lottery is the same in all situations The sure payment is different in every
situation.
1. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 160 thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
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(a) lottery go to question 17
(b) sure payment go to question 2
2. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 80 thousands Rial
as a sure payment?
(a) lottery go to question 10
(b) sure payment go to question 3
3. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 40 thousands Rial
as a sure payment?
(a) lottery go to question 4
(b) sure payment go to question 7
4. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 60 thousands Rial
as a sure payment?
(a) lottery go to question 5
(b) sure payment go to question 6
5. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 70 thousands Rial
as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
6. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 50 thousands Rial
as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
7. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 20 thousands Rial
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as a sure payment?
(a) lottery go to question 8
(b) sure payment go to question 9
8. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 30 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
9. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 10 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
10. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 120 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery go to question 14
(b) sure payment go to question 11
11. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 100 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery go to question 13
(b) sure payment go to question 12
12. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 90 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
13. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
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there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 110 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
14. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 140 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery go to question 15
(b) sure payment go to question 16
15. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 150 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
16. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 130 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
17. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 240 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery go to question 25
(b) sure payment go to question 18
18. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 200 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery go to question 22
(b) sure payment go to question 19
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19. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 180 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery go to question 20
(b) sure payment go to question 21
20. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 190 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
21. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 170 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
22. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 220 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery go to question 23
(b) sure payment go to question 24
23. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 230 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
24. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 210 Thousands




25. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 280 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery go to question 29
(b) sure payment go to question 26
26. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 260 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery go to question 27
(b) sure payment go to question 28
27. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 270 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
28. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 250 Thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
29. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 300 thousands
Rial as a sure payment?
(a) lottery go to question 31
(b) sure payment go to question 30
30. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 290 Thousands




31. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 thousands Rial when at the same time
there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather have the amount of 310 Thousands




Please answer the following question to the best of your ability.
8.1- What amount of money would make you indifferent to 1,000,000 Rials paid to you in 2 weeks?
8.2- What amount of money would make you indifferent to 1,000,000 Rials paid to you in 1 month?
8.3- How much money did you receive for donating your kidney from the receiver not the government?
8.4- Have you spent the money? 1-Yes 2-No
8.5- If so, please describe what you did with the money:
8.6- Please describe what other non-monetary compensations you have received for donating your kid-
ney?
8.7 Are you on any prescribed medication for depression? (Yes/No)
8.8 How confident are you that if you needed a kidney yourself in the future you would be able to obtain
one through the current system? Please indicate which statement below best represents your belief.
(very sure that you would) (sure that you would) (uncertain) (sure that you would not) (very sure that
you would not)
8.9 Would you recommend being a donor to family and friends who needed the money? (Yes/No)
Task 9
Start with the first question. Depending on whether the participant chooses the earlier or the delayed
option, go to the respective next question. This procedure is repeated four times.
Suppose you were given the choice between the following: receiving a payment today or a payment in
2 weeks. We will now present to you have situations. The payment today is the same in each of these
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situations. The payment in 2 weeks is different in every situation. For each of these situations we would
like to know which you would choose.
1. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 142 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today go to question 17 (b) in 2 weeks go to question 2
2. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 111 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today go to question 10 (b) in 2 weeks go to question 3
3. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 95 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today go to question 7 (b) in 2 weeks go to question 4
4. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 88 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today go to question 6 (b) in 2 weeks go to question 5
5. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 84 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today (b) in 2 weeks
6. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 92 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today (b) in 2 weeks
7. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 103 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today go to question 8 (b) in 2 weeks go to question 9
8. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 107 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today (b) in 2 weeks
9. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 99 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today (b) in 2 weeks
10. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 126 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today go to question 14 (b) in 2 weeks go to question 11
11. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 119 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today go to question 13 (b) in 2 weeks go to question 12
12. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 115 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
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(a) today (b) in 2 weeks
13. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 123 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today (b) in 2 weeks
14. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 134 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today go to question 16 (b) in 2 weeks go to question 15
15. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 130 thousands Rial in 2 weeks? (a) today (b) in
2 weeks
16. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 138 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today (b) in 2 weeks
17. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 173 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today go to question 18 (b) in 2 weeks go to question 25
18. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 188 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today go to question 22 (b) in 2 weeks go to question 19
19. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 181 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today go to question 20 (b) in 2 weeks go to question 21
20. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 185 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today (b) in 2 weeks
21. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 177 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today (b) in 2 weeks
22. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 196 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today go to question 23 (b) in 2 weeks go to question 24
23. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 200 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today (b) in 2 weeks
24. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 192 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today (b) in 2 weeks
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25. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 157 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today go to question 29 (b) in 2 weeks go to question 26
26. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 150 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today go to question 28 (b) in 2 weeks go to question 27
27. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 146 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today (b) in 2 weeks
28. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 154 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today (b) in 2 weeks
29. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 165 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today go to question 31 (b) in 2 weeks go to question 30
30. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 161 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today (b) in 2 weeks
31. Would you rather receive 80 thousands Rial today or 169 thousands Rial in 2 weeks?
(a) today (b) in 2 weeks
Task 10
How well do the following statements describe your personality? Please indicate which reply you think
fits you the best.
I see myself as someone who . . .
10.1 . . . is reserved
(1-disagree strongly) (2-disagree a little) (3-neither agree nor disagree) (4-agree a little) (5-agree strongly)
10.2 . . . is generally trusting
(disagree a little) (neither agree nor disagree) (agree a little) (agree strongly)
10.3 . . . tends to be lazy
(disagree a little) (neither agree nor disagree) (agree a little) (agree strongly)
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10.4. . . is relaxed, handles stress well
(disagree a little) (neither agree nor disagree) (agree a little) (agree strongly)
10.5 . . . has few artistic interests
(disagree a little) (neither agree nor disagree) (agree a little) (agree strongly)
10.6 . . . is outgoing, sociable
(disagree a little) (neither agree nor disagree) (agree a little) (agree strongly)
10.7 . . . tends to find fault with others
(disagree a little) (neither agree nor disagree) (agree a little) (agree strongly)
10.8 . . . does a thorough job
(disagree a little) (neither agree nor disagree) (agree a little) (agree strongly)
10.9 . . . gets nervous easily
(disagree a little) (neither agree nor disagree) (agree a little) (agree strongly)
10.10 . . . has an active imagination
(disagree a little) (neither agree nor disagree) (agree a little) (agree strongly)
Task 11
For each of the following statements, please indicate which reply best describes you.
11.1 I plan tasks carefully
(rarely/never)(occasionally)(often)(almost always)
11.2 I do things without thinking
(rarely/never)(occasionally)(often)(almost always)
11.3 I don’t “pay attention”
(rarely/never)(occasionally)(often)(almost always)
11.4 I concentrate easily
(rarely/never)(occasionally)(often)(almost always)
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11.5 I save money on a regular basis
(rarely/never)(occasionally)(often)(almost always)
11.6 I squirm at plays or lectures
(rarely/never)(occasionally)(often)(almost always)
11.7 I am a careful thinker
(rarely/never)(occasionally)(often)(almost always)
11.8 I plan for job security
(rarely/never)(occasionally)(often)(almost always)
11.9 I say things without thinking
(rarely/never)(occasionally)(often)(almost always)
11.10 I act “on impulse”
(rarely/never)(occasionally)(often)(almost always)
11.11 I get easily bored when solving thought problems
(rarely/never)(occasionally)(often)(almost always)
11.12 I act on the spur of the moment
(rarely/never)(occasionally)(often)(almost always)
11.13 I buy things on impulse
(rarely/never)(occasionally)(often)(almost always)
11.14 I am restless at lectures or talks
(rarely/never)(occasionally)(often)(almost always)
11.15 I plan for the future
(rarely/never)(occasionally)(often)(almost always)
End of session
Thanks for your participation.
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